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Socialism and democratic strategy in Italy’s Biennio Rosso: Gramsci contra Treves 
Mark McNally 
Abstract 
This article examines the divisions in Italian Socialism between Revolutionaries and Reformists 
against the backdrop of the Biennio Rosso (1919-20), taking the writings of Antonio Gramsci and 
Claudio Treves respectively as characteristic of the two traditions. The central focus is on their 
opposing accounts of how the Socialist movement should organize the masses to achieve its 
objectives – referred to here as its ‘democratic strategy.’ I demonstrate how the key strategic 
elements of Gramsci’s and Treves’s positions developed  in a dialogue centered on the place 
violence, (il)legality, soviets, parliaments and compromise should play in effectively mobilizing 
the masses for Socialism. The article concludes by arguing that in retrospect Treves’s Reformism 
has been a more successful approach, and Gramsci himself conceded something to it in his prison 
writings. However, I also maintain that the popular character of Gramsci’s radical democratic 
strategy - first fashioned in the Biennio Rosso - can still contribute to debates on Socialism and 
Social Democracy today.   
Questo articolo, utilizzando gli scritti di Antonio Gramsci e Claudio Treves, esamina 
rispettivamente le differenze fra le tradizioni del socialismo rivoluzionario e del socialismo 
riformista, durante il Biennio Rosso (1919-1920) in Italia. L’attenzione è sulle loro posizioni 
divergenti di come il movimento socialista dovrebbe organizzare le masse – qui descritto come 
‘strategia democratica’ – per raggiungere i suoi obiettivi.  In questo articolo dimostro come gli 
elementi strategici fondamentali di Gramsci e di Treves sono sviluppati in un dialogo centrato 
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sull’utilizzo della violenza, dell’(il)legalità, dei soviets, dei parlamenti e del compromesso per 
mobilitare le masse al fine di raggiungere il socialismo in modo efficace. L'articolo conclude 
sostenendo che, a posteriori, il riformismo di Treves è stato un approccio più efficace e che 
Gramsci nei suoi scritti dal carcere vi ci si avvicinò. Tuttavia, affermo anche che il carattere 
popolare della strategia democratica radicale di Gramsci – pensata in primis durante il Biennio 
Rosso - può ancora contribuire ai dibattiti sul socialismo e sulla socialdemocrazia oggi. 
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Introduction 
Almost one hundred years ago Italian Socialism entered into a series of ferocious internal 
conflicts in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution (1917) and the First World War (1914-18) 
that shaped its history throughout much of the twentieth century. Indeed, the momentous 
events of Italy’s Biennio Rosso (1919-20) - ‘Two Red Years’ - in which  Revolutionary Socialist ideas 
and industrial and social unrest swept across the country had a significant impact on the course 
of European politics more generally. Thus, the arrival of Bolshevism in Italy weakened Italy’s 
fledgling parliamentary democracy irretrievably (the so-called ‘crisis of the Liberal State’) and 
paved the way for the rise of Fascism, but also, shaped the divisions in Italian politics thereafter 
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(Banin 2013; Maione 1975; Spriano 1975). In a European context, the Biennio Rosso stands out 
as one of the key battlegrounds and defining moments in the struggle between Reformist and 
Revolutionary Socialism which not only had reverberations across the continent at the time, but 
– as I will demonstrate below – continues to speak to debates in Socialist thought today as we 
approach its centenary. 
For Italian Socialism, in particular, the importance of the Biennio Rosso can hardly be 
understated. By late 1920, it had effectively left the PSI (Partito Socialista Italiano) disastrously 
divided into Reformist, Communist and Maximalist factions. The Communists in fact left the Party 
in January 1921 to form the Partito Comunista d’Italia (PCI) in disgust at its lack of revolutionary 
principle; Filippo Turati’s Reformist wing was forced out in October 1922 creating the Partito 
Socialista Unitario (PSU); leaving the PSI in the hands of Giacinto Serrati’s dominant Maximalist 
faction (De Grand 1989, 31-45). Despite its retrospective idealization as a missed opportunity to 
accomplish Socialist revolution in Italy (Spriano 1975, 126-137), the ultimate effects of the 
Biennio Rosso were therefore the fragmentation and weakening of Italian Socialism which it 
arguably never recovered from.  
This article sets out to make a contribution to our understanding of the Biennio Rosso and its 
impact on Italian and European Socialism, exploring the fierce conflict between Reformist and 
Communist wings of the PSI. It examines the work of two leading lights in the opposing camps – 
the Revolutionary Antonio Gramsci and the Reformist Claudio Treves – against the historical 
backdrop of the Biennio Rosso. The focus is primarily on their opposing visions of the relations 
Socialism was required to establish with the masses to achieve its goals of a radical 
4 
 
transformation of society – referred to here as their competing democratic strategies (on 
Gramsci’s mass political strategy, see Fontana 1993; McNally 2015; Salvadori 2007).  
The history of Gramsci’s contribution to the Turin Factory Council Movement in the Biennio Rosso 
and his ideas on industrial democracy while editor of the L’Ordine Nuovo journal have of course 
been well-documented (Bellamy and Schecter 1993, 28-58; Clark 1977; Schecter 1991; Spriano 
1965, 1971, 1975; Williams 1975). Indeed, there is now an extensive literature on the political 
and intellectual context of these  writings which chart the development of Gramsci’s ideas in 
relation to Serrati’s Maximalism and Bordiga’s dogmatic Communist creed (De Felice 1971; 
Cammett 1967, Part II); Sorel and the Anarcho-Syndicalist tradition (Levy 1999; Schecter 1990, 
637-653; Spriano 1965, 56-62); and the American Daniel de Leon and the English Shop Steward 
Movement (Davidson 1974, 41-42; Spriano 1965, 69-73). Surprisingly, however, there is a relative 
lack of scholarship on the relationship of his early L’Ordine Nuovo writings with the Reformist 
Socialist tradition (see though, Levy 2001; Orsini 2012). My intention is therefore to redress this 
here by charting his development of a democratic strategy defined against Italian Reformism in 
the Biennio Rosso.   
Similarly, the meagre literature on Claudio Treves to date provides little insight into his thought 
during this crucial period, or more importantly, how he employed the main Reformist organ – 
Critica Sociale - to develop an account of the proper relations Socialism must forge with the 
masses.1 Indeed, our knowledge of Treves is manly restricted to his own journalism and published 
works (1945, 1981, 1983, 1995, 2014) and two biographical studies (including selections of 
Treves’s writings) by Antonio Casali (1985, 1989). This is somewhat surprising since Treves was 
not only among the founding members of the PSI, but also, had a colorful and extraordinary 
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career. Like Gramsci, he was imprisoned and exiled for his beliefs,2 which he defended at the 
point of a sword in duel with Benito Mussolini in 1915 – then a Revolutionary Socialist - wounding 
the budding dictator’s ear (Matteotti 1987).   
This article, thus, sets out to make a contribution to debates on Treves as well as neglected 
aspects of Gramsci’s thought, taking nonetheless as its primary concern the very contemporary 
issue of the relationship Socialist movements are required to establish with the masses to achieve 
success.  In this spirit, it concludes with a more general reflection on the lessons and legacies of 
the Biennio Rosso for contemporary Socialism, arguing that while history would seem to have 
vindicated key elements of Treves’s Reformist approach – which Gramsci himself appeared to 
partially recognize in his prison writings – the more popular character of Gramsci’s democratic 
strategy can still contribute to debates on the dilemmas of Socialism and Social Democracy today. 
Such a discussion will, however, only make sense if we first capture the fundamental historical 
context of the Biennio Rosso and the contrasting visions of Gramsci and Treves on mass 
democratic politics that were forged against its backdrop. 
 
The Biennio Rosso (1919-20) 
The battle between Reformist and Revolutionary Socialists in Italy which reached its height in the 
Biennio Rosso had arguably been raging since the founding of the PSI at Genoa in 1892 (Cortesi 
1972). The presence of strong Anarchist and Syndicalist traditions on the Italian Left gave the 
conflict a unique character (Levy 1989, 1993, 2000). However, as elsewhere in Europe, the 
divisions were given particular impetus by the splits in the Second International occasioned by 
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the emergence of Eduard Bernstein’s Revisionist Marxism in the 1890s (Arfe 1965, 83-97; 
Lindemann 1983, 147-158), and crucially, the outbreak of the First World War. The latter divided 
Socialists between dominant ‘patriotic’ parties supporting their national governments; ‘neutrals’ 
refusing to take sides; and ‘Revolutionaries’ who sought to use the War to foment domestic 
sedition (Sassoon 1996, 5-31). Despite some dissent from Mussolini among others, (Clark 2014, 
220), the PSI stood among the neutrals with its famous ‘neither support nor sabotage’ policy 
(Galli 1980, 81-95).   
It was however the outbreak of the Russian Revolution and the foundation of the Comintern (the 
Third International) in the spring of 1919 which brought to a head the divisions between 
Reformist and Revolutionary Socialists in Italy (Caretti 1974). At its inaugural Congress in 1919 it 
denounced the Reformists and ‘Centrists’ (identified with intermediary elements such as Karl 
Kautsky) as ‘opportunists’ bereft of revolutionary principle whose parties had become, under the 
stewardship of the Second International, ‘subsidiary organs of the bourgeois state’ (Trotsky 1956, 
46). In the (in)famous Twenty-One Points of August 1920 the Comintern accordingly demanded 
of its affiliating parties ‘a complete and absolute break with Reformism and with the policy of the 
Centre’ and the expulsion of ‘notorious opportunists’ such as Turati (Lenin 1956, 170). 
 
Unsurprisingly, the early Comintern’s dogmatic revolutionary creed and commitment to purge 
Reformist and Centrist factions from the Socialist movement created an explosive situation in 
Italy given the immense post-war social unrest and the presence of all tendencies within Italian 
Socialism (Caretti 1974, 95-163).   While the Maximalist leadership of the PSI under Serrati 
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appeared at first to champion its causes, in practice it did little to realize them (Davidson 1977, 
131-132; Sabbatucci 1996, 49-50) and shared more with Centrists elsewhere in Europe. It was 
rather the emerging Revolutionary Socialist wing of the PSI who were firmest in their demands 
for action in line with Moscow. A group of these future PCI members – including Antonio Gramsci, 
Palmiro Togliatti and Angelo Tasca – had already founded the L’Ordine Nuovo journal in Turin in 
May 1919 to pursue radical Socialist objectives in the field of proletarian culture and education. 
The journal was, however, only a month in publication when it embarked on the much more 
ambitious programme of translating the soviet experience of the Bolsheviks to Italy by proposing 
the ‘internal commissions’ (already operating in Torinese factories as a form of negotiated worker 
involvement) be transformed into the nucleus of a system of Italian self-governing soviets or 
workers’ councils (Gramsci 1977l, 66-67).3 As the mass social unrest intensified and the militancy 
of Turin’s metallurgical workers in particular grew, it was not long before councils were sprouting 
up all over Italy’s ‘Petrograd’ and beyond, replacing the CGL as the dominant force in the work-
place (Williams 1975, 85).  
 
Throughout 1918-19 working class unrest had in fact been increasing steadily in Italy (Clark 1977, 
13-35). The impact of the Russian Revolution and the establishment of the Comintern dominated 
the PSI’s annual Congress at Bologna in October 1919 where the battle between Reformists and 
Revolutionaries raged openly. While the Congress fell short of expelling the minority Reformist 
faction (including Treves and Turati) in line with Amadeo Bordiga’s inflexible Communist platform 
(Cammett 1967, 68-69), it nonetheless endorsed by a large majority a radical programme by 
Serrati’s Maximalist leadership to join the Comintern and pursue its aim of ‘proletarian 
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dictatorship’ (De Grand 1989, 37).  With this overtly revolutionary agenda the PSI swept to victory 
in Italy’s first election under full male suffrage in November 1919, winning an additional 100 seats 
and emerging as the largest party in parliament (Duggan 2008, 422). The country thus seemed 
on the brink of Socialist revolution as it faced into 1920.  
 
Indeed, radicals like Gramsci would look back on 1920 as a missed opportunity to establish a 
Socialist state in Italy. They attributed its failure to the lack of support by Reformists and 
Maximalists in the Party and trade unions who not only failed to mobilize the workers behind the 
revolutionary surge at its height in April 1920 when Piedmont was virtually closed down in a 
general strike, but did their utmost to subdue the revolutionary potential of the situation 
(Gramsci 1977g, 319-320). In September, when workers mounted a second wave of strikes in 
which they took control of the factories and continued production for a time alone, it was 
therefore the Party and CGL who willingly stepped in to end the unrest by brokering an 
‘economic’ compromise between industrialists, government and workers (Clark 1977, 168-180).  
Gramsci of course sought to direct the crisis of the Biennio Rosso towards a revolutionary 
denouement (Martin 1998, 19-29). Treves, by contrast, played a significant part in quelling its 
revolutionary élan and re-directing the focus of Italian Socialism away from the militant councils 
and back to the moderate Reformist bastions of parliament and trade unions.  As Spriano has 
shown, he not only facilitated the negotiations between the unions and government to resolve 
the dispute ‘peacefully and legally,’ but even suggested the authorities should use force against 
striking workers to re-occupy the factories if necessary (1975, 176-177).  Underlying these 
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conflicting approaches were of course fundamental divergences on how Socialism should harness 
the power of the masses to meet its objectives which the popular unrest of the Biennio Rosso 
had placed firmly on the agenda of Italian and European politics. It is to these key strategic 
debates which I now turn. 
 
Legality, violence and responsibility in mass politics 
As elsewhere in Western Europe in the post-First World War context, there was perhaps no more 
fundamental divergence between Italian Reformist and Revolutionary Socialists over the correct 
democratic strategy to pursue Socialism than that which revolved around the promotion and use 
of mass illegality and violence aimed at the overthrow of the Capitalist state. In Italy, Reformists 
tended to share with Bernstein and Kautsky a preference for ‘peaceful’ and ‘legal’ means led by 
responsible elites that eschewed mass insurgency and the ‘dictatorial’ methods of the Bolsheviks 
(Di Scala 1996, 19; Miller 1975, 106). There has been a tendency to examine this debate between 
Reformists and Revolutionaries in terms of the ‘orthodoxy’ of violence and dictatorship in Marxist 
theory (Andreucci 1986; Caretti 1974; Santarelli 1964).  However, what has arguably been 
neglected is the manner in which both sides evaluated the benefits and dangers of illegal and 
violent action in terms of its potential to harness mass support and advance the cause of 
Socialism in a Western European state like Italy.  
 
The Reformist defense of pursuing a legal strategy was clearly shaped by the belief that legality 
and non-violence were already part of mass working-class culture in the West, and it thus shared 
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much with a wider Pacifist strain in Second International Marxism exemplified by Kautsky (2012, 
4-41). This owed much of course to the PSI’s birth as an anti-insurrectionist movement since at 
the party’s inception in the Sala Sivori in Genoa in 1892, the Socialists led by Turati had famously 
split from the Anarchists when the latter attempted to block a strategy of peaceful constitutional 
politics (Di Scala 1980, 19-22).  This Reformist-Pacifist tendency dominated the Party until the 
eve of the Biennio Rosso and it was reflected in the PSI’s refusal to comply with Giolitti’s colonial 
War in Libya (1911-12),4  and more significantly, in its neutral position on the First World War. 
When the party leadership appeared to turn to an intransigent strategy of mass violence and 
dictatorship in response to the popular unrest unleashed by the post-war economic catastrophe 
and the rousing example of the Russian Revolution, the Reformists thus condemned it as the 
height of irresponsibility and a betrayal of the true tradition of Italian Socialism established at 
Genoa.  Indeed, in the run-up to the Bologna Congress in October 1919, Treves and Critica Sociale 
were quick to draw the parallels with the past, claiming that ‘Maximalism’ was simply a ‘literal 
and flagrant reproduction…of the pre-Socialist Anarchism of Sala Sivori, against which, the 
Socialist Party emerged and affirmed itself in Italy – thirty years ago!’ The journal promised to 
oppose this rage for ‘armed insurrection’ with the ‘Socialism of Genoa,’ and to defend it ‘tooth 
and nail, to the grave and beyond’ (“La Critica Sociale” 1919b, 221-222).5  
   
A key aspect of this defense was Treves’s frequent accusations that ‘intransigents’ were 
exploiting a transitory ‘cult of violence’ among sections of the masses who had been brutalized 
in war and were thus particularly susceptible to the myth of the miraculous effect of popular 
violence in the Russian Revolution. ‘Maximalism,’ he argued, in its naïve belief in the Bolshevik’s 
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audacious and triumphant clash with the Capitalist state [un cozzo], ‘is spiritually, 
voluntarist…appeals to the [base] instincts of the masses, and has a blind faith in violence and 
miracles’ (Treves 1920g, 243). Such criticism was however mainly reserved for dedicated 
Revolutionary elements such as Gramsci. For from the outset, the Reformists were unconvinced 
by Serrati’s commitment to mass insurrection. The leadership was thus more often accused of 
conducting ‘the most shameless bluff ever attempted’ in talking up the rhetoric of violent 
revolution and ‘imitating Russia’ (“La Critica Sociale” 1919b, 222). In the aftermath of the April 
defeat Treves accordingly excoriated the Maximalists’ Bologna Programme which had exalted 
‘uprising’ (‘sommossa’) while party leaders stood aloof from the consequences, refusing to 
command a struggle they initiated in which the masses lost their lives and livelihoods (1920c, 
193). 
Nonetheless, for Treves and Critica Sociale, whether the advocacy of mass violence and illegality 
was genuine or not, it was wholly irresponsible since it threatened to unleash a wave of reaction 
that would damage the cause of Italian Socialism and the gains it had already achieved.  ‘The 
promise to do “as in Russia”’ Treves therefore argued, ‘…does not hold, as Italy is not…Russia’ 
and an Italian revolution would quickly be suppressed by international Capitalism and the forces 
of the Entente (1919a, 271). In September 1919 he was already warning that though the post-
war Italian state ‘is little prepared for a return to production, it is still immeasurably strong 
enough to return to reaction’ (Treves 1919d, 240). Turati developed this argument further at 
Bologna in October, spelling out clearly the potential consequences of the Party’s rhetoric of 
insurrection:  
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Who among you takes seriously this armed revolution which so many talk 
endlessly about? …This is a monstrous scam, a farce which for others could 
descend into tragedy: the preparation of war tribunals; ferocious reaction; the 
ruination of the movement for half a century… (1920a, 268).6 
Such rebukes by Turati were of course greeted with howls of disapproval and endless heckling at 
Bologna, but Gramsci and the L’Ordine Nuovo were acutely aware that they required a serious 
and convincing response. 
Gramsci’s defense of mass illegal and violent methods in fact followed for the most part many of 
the familiar themes of Leninism and the Comintern.  Imperialist Capitalism, he thus argued, was 
exhausted and the War had finally brought ‘the catastrophe of the Capitalist world’ predicted by 
Marx. Only Socialism and the working class could rescue Western civilization and Italy from 
‘barbarism’ and ‘economic ruin’ (Gramsci 1977e, 89). But to set it on solid foundations and secure 
its economic development Socialists had to step up to the mark and take revolutionary 
responsibility for mobilizing the popular military overthrow of Capitalism. This, he stated plainly, 
necessitated mass violence and the establishment of ‘a dictatorship’ with a ‘markedly military 
character’ (Gramsci 1994c, 105). Its primary tasks were ‘the expulsion of the Capitalists from the 
factory’ (Gramsci 1919c, 37) and ‘the systematic suppression of private property, and the 
bourgeois class in all its forms of domination: parliaments, newspapers, political parties, banks, 
professional armies…’ (Gramsci 1919b, 88).  In line with this position, L’Ordine Nuovo initially 
welcomed the party’s Bologna Programme and particularly its candid statement that ‘the 
proletariat will need to have recourse to violence to defend itself against bourgeois violence, for 
the conquest of power and for the consolidation of revolutionary achievements’ which it warned 
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would demand ‘spiritual and technical preparation’ among the masses (‘Il nuovo programma del 
Partito’ 1919, 160).  
The L’Ordine Nuovo group under Gramsci’s editorship in fact gave special prominence to this 
issue of mass preparation and action, modeling themselves on their idealized version of  popular 
Bolshevism that involved ‘bold thinking and revolutionary action’ and spurned the tame and inert 
approach of Reformist ‘has-beens’ (Gramsci 1994b, 142-145). From early on, the journal thus 
combined their Revolutionary Socialist ideology with reports of their practical organizational 
work among the Torinese working masses that notably included a school of revolutionary 
propaganda (Clark 1977, 72-73). Indeed, as a mark of their ultimate insurrectionary ambitions 
the journal made a point of publishing regular articles on organizing a Socialist army which it 
argued was crucial for proletarian victory (Gramsci 1994c, 105).   
By early 1920, however, Gramsci was already complaining that despite the propitious conditions 
the leadership had made no move to prepare and organize the masses for the conquest of power. 
In contrast to Reformist charges of a reckless and disingenuous commitment to revolution, 
Gramsci and the Turin Socialists complained of its lack of revolutionary responsibility to the 
masses and its failure to make good on its commitments at Bologna. In January 1920 the radical 
Turin section of the PSI published a programme of action penned by Gramsci in L’Ordine Nuovo 
that promised to lead and spur the Party into action. It set out plans to proceed to the arming of 
workers, willingly taking ‘responsibility for pushing the Socialist Party to promote the 
establishment of Workers’ and Peasants’ Councils all over Italy.’ These, in turn, it argued would 
‘begin the task of building the higher institutions (the political Soviets) in which the dictatorship 
of the proletariat will be embodied’ (Gramsci 1977a, 159).  This initial confidence, however, soon 
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turned to disillusionment and anger after the April defeat and the part the leadership’s inaction 
had played in it. From then onwards Gramsci began to progressively distance himself from the 
Socialist Party, as he turned his attention to the creation of a Communist party that could be 
trusted to prepare and lead a popular revolutionary dictatorship in Italy (Clark 1977, 174).  
But the onslaught on Treves and Turati nevertheless continued. The Reformists’ duplicity and 
hypocrisy in condemning ‘undemocratic’ belligerent Communists while ignoring and excusing the 
‘bourgeois dictatorship’ – illustrated in its suppression of workers in 1920 – was particularly 
prevalent (Gramsci 1977c, 128). Gramsci thus mocked Turati’s attempts to contrast Italy’s 
parliamentary democracy to the soviet as a distinction between ‘civilization and the barbarian 
hordes,’ maintaining that the Italian State was a ‘ruthless dictatorship of the propertied classes’ 
that ‘regarded the working people as …an inferior race, to be governed …like an African colony’ 
(1994b, 142-143). He poured scorn too on Reformist claims that Communists were proposing 
slaying Capitalism through a simple and swift ‘revolt.’ ‘The revolution,’ he argued, ‘is not a 
thaumaturgical act, but a dialectical process of historical development’ (Gramsci 1977e, 92) that 
was epochal and required years of popular struggle that inevitably would entail defeats and set-
backs. Although it was not assured, he maintained that victory was possible if the Party actually 
took seriously its responsibility to organize the revolution among the masses (Salvadori 2007, 55-
56). 
 
The institutional debate and the masses: Parliament versus soviet  
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The character and location of this mass organizational work was of course a major bone of 
contention that turned on the vital strategic consideration as to which institution was best suited 
to lead the people towards Socialism in post-war Italy: parliament (and the parliamentary 
Socialist Party) or soviet. Treves and the Reformists at Critica Sociale argued that the potential of 
parliamentary democracy in Italy had barely been tested and the advent of full male suffrage in 
1919 opened up the possibility of pursuing a programme of radical Socialist reform on the back 
of increasing parliamentary majorities. The Reformists thus defended an electoral strategy 
conducted primarily by parliamentary elites with the Party and trade unions playing a central role 
in periodic mobilizations of the newly enfranchised masses to obtain decisive electoral victories.  
Even before the Socialist success in the November 1919 election, at the Bologna Congress Turati 
had complained of the Party’s failure to exploit ‘an essentially Reformist period,’ spelling out his 
case in stark numerical terms:  
Out of 22 or 23 million future voters, they [the bourgeoisie] make up 2 to 3 million. 
Eight to nine tenths of voters are authentically proletarian; that is, industrial 
workers, rural workers, sea workers, small-scale office employees…This is the 
enormous majority that universal suffrage provides. …Universal suffrage puts in 
your hands the conquest of the state and, in fact, all of the conquests that you 
wish to achieve by insurrection (1920a, 265). 
When the November victory went some way in confirming the potential of an electoral strategy 
it was greeted in a Critica Sociale editorial as ‘…a revolution! Legal, conspicuously legal; Pacifist; 
conspicuously Pacifist – but a revolution all the same’ (“La Critica Sociale” 1919a, 301). In fact, 
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thereafter Treves and Critica Sociale began to agitate for the PSI deputies to ‘take power’ through 
the institutions of parliamentary democracy (Treves 1920a, 17-18). 
The Reformists, moreover, contrasted the good sense of this strategy with the Party’s apparent 
revolutionary commitment to mobilize the masses in what Treves described as 'a great frontal 
attack all across the frontier of the state’ (1920e, 150-151). This approach, he argued, ensured 
the paralysis of Socialist Reformism in parliament where the PSI remained ‘in the Chamber like a 
stranger making some noise every now and again to mark his presence and importance, 
inconveniencing all others a little, but taking no part in the real decision-making’ (Treves 1920e,  
151). Indeed, the Party was accused of rejoicing in its inaction which led to regressive 
authoritarian legislation that it deluded itself would radicalize and spur the masses into 
revolutionary action since ‘the worse it is, the better it gets [tanto peggio, tanto meglio], the 
more reaction there is, the brighter the revolutionary dawn’ (Treves 1920h, 98).  On the other 
hand, the Reformists also pointed at times to the hypocrisy of the PSI’s ‘revolutionary’ Maximalist 
deputies who expounded the Bolshevik rhetoric of corrupt ‘bourgeois democracy’ and relentless 
class conflict, while periodically making common cause with Reformist and Liberal deputies to 
vote for broadly progressive legislation (Treves 1920h, 98; see too Mondolfo 1920, 25-26). 
Finally, Treves mounted a two-pronged and not entirely consistent attack on the idea that the 
soviet should replace parliament as the institution uniquely equipped to lead the Italian masses 
towards Socialism. Revolutionaries like Gramsci, he argued, simply refused to recognize that Italy 
and the Second International states were ‘in the already rich West [nel già ricco Occidentale]’ 
whereas Russia and the Third International were ‘in the East [in Oriente]’ (Treves 1919c, 97). 
Consequently, their ‘soviettismo’ was merely a case of ‘attempting to transplant a revolutionary 
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institution alien to our climate and soil’ (Treves 1920f, 130). Despite the revolutionary fervor of 
post-war Italy, Treves argued, that in the long-term its authoritarian character would be 
emphatically rejected by the Italian working masses, since they had long been organized in a free, 
open and democratic Socialist organization based on party, trade unions and cooperatives. As 
the PSI drew closer to the Comintern in late 1920 Treves returned again and again to this theme 
of the necessity for distinct strategies in the authoritarian East and democratic West insisting in 
October: 
The East is not the West.  The methods which are attuned to where there is no 
tradition, liberty or self-criticism, cannot be adapted to places where the 
proletariat has a cultivated Marxism…and for many many years has been trained 
to…express in a more democratic manner their own will in the great assemblies of 
their political and economic organizations (1920b, 306).  
While this was a dominant theme of Treves’s rhetoric, it is important to note too that outright 
rejection of the soviet was sometimes off-set by a somewhat more conciliatory position. Drawing 
heavily on the traditions of German Social Democracy and Guild Socialism in Britain (see, Cole 
1919, 203-204; Tosatti 1919, 134-136), Treves occasionally endorsed the idea that there could 
be a place for the soviet in Italian Socialism, though one which emphatically subordinated it to 
the parliamentary party and trade unions (1919a, 270-271). He therefore suggested that soviets 
could fulfill a democratic and technical role on the shop-floor of the emerging Socialist economy:   
We believe and hope for yet the conquest of the interior of the State: firstly, with 
the direct pressure of the proletariat on the orders of production, with its training 
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to employ the instruments of control in the factory – internal commissions or 
factory councils which temper the despotic right of the entrepreneur and affirm, 
temporarily, constitutional right in the factory. Secondly, with the acquisition, in 
all useful manners, of political and parliamentary power, which should put in the 
hands of the proletariat the courts, the prefectures, the military barracks in a 
manner that directs them opportunely and victoriously against the inevitable 
counter-revolution (Treves 1920f, 130). 
Indeed, Treves contrasted this ‘integral’ Socialist strategy that ‘demands and equally profits from 
trade union action, cooperative action, local government action, cultural action and was all 
assisted, defended and valued by parliamentary action’ with the narrow ‘soviettismo’ and quasi-
Syndicalism of Gramsci. In sum, for Treves, Sovietists like Gramsci overlooked the fact that the 
conquest of power in the factory would be a short-lived disastrous affair without the wider 
apparatus of a socialized integral state led from parliament to provide it with civil and military 
protection (1919a, 270-272; see too, Baldesi 1920, 134-136). 
Gramsci’s response to such criticism and the Reformist defense of parliamentary democracy was 
to claim that ‘the Parliament of deputies elected by universal suffrage (i.e by the exploiters and 
the exploited)’ was not ‘democracy’ at all but ‘the mask of bourgeois dictatorship’ (1977c, 127). 
He maintained in particular that the Reformists’ positivist and primitive mindset left them 
incapable of conceiving of democracy as an historical process of mass empowerment. 
Consequently, Turati’s scientific Socialism determined that ‘democracy’ was objectively 
‘parliamentary democracy’ and he therefore could not see beyond ‘the perpetuity and 
fundamental perfection of the institutions of the democratic State’ (Gramsci 1977d, 76).  
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In response to Reformist charges of advocating the authoritarian anti-democratic methods of the 
East that abolished all rights to legal opposition, Gramsci - like Lenin - insisted in unapologetic 
terms that the exploiters of labor forfeited their rights to democracy. L’Ordine Nuovo he 
therefore proclaimed was ‘antidemocratic as regards its conception of the Socialist state, which 
must be a class state, committed to a revolt that would suppress forcefully private property and 
the exploiting classes.’ But, he quickly added, they were ‘profoundly democratic in their 
conception of the internal relations between the institutions and individuals in the workers’ and 
Socialist movement’ (Gramsci 1919a, 47). Democracy and self-government were therefore to be 
reconceived not only as an ongoing historical project, but one that was provided exclusively to 
workers and their representatives.  
For Gramsci, moreover, parliament and the parliamentary Socialist party, and indeed the trade 
unions, were incapable of leading the Italian people to Socialism since they were highly elitist and 
bureaucratic institutions that excluded the mass of workers from administrative and decision-
making functions (Spriano 1965, 61-63).  They thus lacked the confidence of the masses that was 
required for revolutionary action. In fact, to his lights, the Party in parliament and its trade union 
allies were an integral part of the Capitalist economic and political system. They collaborated and 
bartered with the bourgeoisie to preserve the existing order of mass exploitation in return for 
minor concessions in the workplace or irrelevant paltry reforms in parliament (Gramsci 1977i,  
99; 1919b) - ‘parliamentary “cretinism”’ as Gramsci described it in a phrase borrowed from Marx 
(1977k, 148). 
All of these shortcomings of the Reformists’ parliamentary strategy could, Gramsci believed, be 
overcome by placing the workers’ council at the head of the proletarian struggle. The reasons for 
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according the soviet this vital role were transparent for Gramsci. Firstly, the council was a truly 
revolutionary and radical democratic institution since its purpose was not to negotiate better 
living and working conditions within the bourgeois democratic system, but to implement a 
fundamental rupture with the present by preparing ‘the masses to become accustomed to self-
government both in the industrial and political fields’ (Gramsci 1977e, 90). This idea of the soviet 
as the kernel of a developing self-governing producers’ republic thus contrasted sharply with 
Reformist claims that it was an authoritarian institution suitable only to the backward East.  
Indeed, Gramsci countered, ‘Historical conditions in Italy were not and are not very different 
from those in Russia’ (1977j, 85). Secondly, Gramsci insisted that it was the mass proletarian 
character of the soviets or councils - including the whole workforce of unionized and non-
unionized urban and rural workers – which gave them the potential to mount a much more 
effective challenge to the Capitalist system than Socialist parliamentary elites who kept their 
mass reserves subordinated and passive with the assistance of trade union ‘leaders’ and 
bureaucrats. Responding to Reformist charges of Syndicalism Gramsci thus maintained: 
The Syndicalist tendency of L’Ordine Nuovo is a myth. We simply are so mistaken 
as to believe that the Communist revolution can only be actuated by the masses 
and neither a party secretary not a president of the republic can bring it about by 
decree.  It seems to me that this was the opinion of Karl Marx, Rosa Luxemburg 
and it is the opinion of Lenin - all of whom for Treves and Turati are anarcho-
Syndicalists (1920a, 129). 
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Finally, Gramsci was adamantly opposed to ‘integralist’ attempts by Reformists to subordinate 
the developing soviets to the wider parliamentary and trade union apparatus.  ‘The Party,’ he 
insisted, must:   
…resist any attempt on the part of the Reformists and opportunists to turn control into a 
function of the bourgeois State and make the Factory Councils into organs of industrial 
collaboration …with the bourgeois State bureaucracy and with Parliament. Control must be 
exercised by purely proletarian organs, and the working class must make it the vehicle for 
their mass revolutionary action (Gramsci 1977a, 159).  
The integral Socialism of the Reformists that privileged the network of elites across parliamentary 
party, trade unions and cooperatives to lead a largely passive mass was thus anathema to 
Gramsci who placed significant faith in the capacity of the workers themselves to organize and 
bring about Socialism in the councils. He therefore advocated a much more radical and popular 
democratic strategy that conceived democracy as an historical process of genuine mass 
empowerment and self-governance. In this alternative vision of a socialist democracy the soviets 
were charged not only with organizing a revolution of the masses, but also administering and 
self-governing the Socialist state and economy in its aftermath. 
 
The masses, strategic compromise and class confrontation 
To achieve this Socialist society Gramsci was convinced too that the working-class militancy that 
flared up in the revolutionary epoch of the Biennio Rosso must be forged into an enduring 
ideology of class confrontation. This position was of course defined against the Reformist and 
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Second International tendency to employ a strategy of elite-based compromises to pursue 
piecemeal reforms. The debate here was bound up with two conflicting theoretical views of the 
historical process of transition from Capitalism to Socialism. For Reformists like Treves and Turati, 
entrenched in a positivist scientific Socialist tradition, this process was characterized by near 
natural laws that guaranteed the expansion of the productive forces under monopoly Capitalism 
towards its political exhaustion and an increasingly planned Socialist economy. The Party elite in 
this schema was required to play a key pedagogical role in the long struggle to educate the 
masses for Socialism to complement the already determined evolution of the economy (Di Scala 
1980, 58; Miller 1975, 107-108).  This economistic conception of the historical process not only 
perceived the development of Socialism as driven by the economic base, but maintained that 
mass working-class culture lagged woefully behind economic development and a long transition 
period was therefore required to educate the workers.  In these conditions, working-class leaders 
were inevitably required to make political compromises and cooperate with other progressive 
elites prepared to assist the development of Socialism.  
Italian Reformists thus extolled the virtues of ‘evolutionary Socialism’ (Treves 1919b, 205-207;   
Turati 1919, 289-290) and Turati in his June 1920 ‘Rifare L’Italia’ speech insisted that the post-
war revolutionary period would be a long and complicated era of gradual progress towards 
Socialism (1920b, 196).  It was, moreover, for the Reformists an era pregnant not only with 
opportunity to extend the rights and power of the workers, but also, with dangers of regressive 
reaction. A skillful and mainly parliamentary politics of strategic compromise was required to 
avert this. It would however take a very different shape than it had done in the past when 
Reformists had provided support to the Zanardelli and Giolitti Liberal governments (1901-11) as 
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subordinate partners in return for concessionary reforms and to avoid a return to the anti-
Socialist reaction of the 1890s (De Grand 1996, 23-37). In the post-war revolutionary context 
Treves and Turati advocated a ‘radical Reformism’ that placed Socialist forces firmly in a situation 
of ascendancy in this new order of elite strategic compromise.  
Treves’s famous ‘espiazione’ speech in parliament in March 1920 stands out as one of the most 
important statements of this Reformist position. Addressing himself directly to the Liberals in the 
Italian Parliament, he proclaimed, in the era of Capitalist decline ‘you can no longer impose your 
order on us and we cannot yet impose ours on you.’ The proletariat, he thus argued, is compelled 
to rely on bourgeois cooperation in such circumstances, but this could ‘only be the collaboration 
of the two sides of a scale in which one is falling and the other rising’ (Treves 1920d, 1634).  The 
bourgeoisie, moreover, could expect no swift deliverance from this period of subordinate 
collaboration which he conceived as a necessary atonement for the sins of Capitalism:  
Revolution is an age, not a day.   …of course, you would like it to be over and done 
with. …But it is not in our power to cut short the forward movement of God’s plan. 
That is terribly long and painful. Though long and painful, it is also necessary. …This 
is the inexorable corollary of the crime. Yes, gentlemen, this is the expiation 
(Treves 1920d, 1641).7 
This theme of a system of strategic compromises with the progressive bourgeoisie on the basis 
of proletarian ascendancy was elaborated further in other famous statements of Reformism of 
the period, and was consistent with their attempts to dampen the revolutionary ardor of the 
Biennio Rosso and the dangers of reaction it engendered. In an article entitled ‘Andare al Potere’ 
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in May 1920, Francesco Ciccotti thus pictured the revolution in Italy as one in which ‘the Socialist 
proletariat will arrive at its first landmark through a gradual acquisition of political and economic 
power...by way of a gangplank’ taking with them ‘the last exemplary politicians of the 
bourgeoisie’ (1920, 131). In a similar vein, Turati’s ‘Rifare L’Italia’ speech in June picked up on 
Treves’s account of the expiation calling on the bourgeoisie to render the transition period that 
was manifestly underway less bloody by ‘ceding power’ and offering its own ‘collaboration’ to 
the emerging Socialist regime.  Indeed, he recognized the inability of the proletariat to make an 
immediate transition to Socialism in the economy, maintaining that the Socialists could only take 
political and economic power through cooperation and compromise ‘with bourgeois forces, 
bourgeois elements, technicians and experts who are willing to serve loyally the proletariat and 
Socialism’ (Turati 1920b, 196).  
Gramsci and the L’Ordine Nuovo, by contrast, derided this Reformist preference for strategic 
compromise with the bourgeoisie, opting instead for relentless class confrontation and a more 
direct Bolshevik-style route to Socialism. Writing in May 1918 Gramsci had already maintained 
the PSI ‘cannot collaborate with any organized bourgeois parliamentary groupings without doing 
mischief’ and turning itself into ‘a ghastly hybrid …devoid of will or political aims.’  ‘The Socialist 
Party,’ he maintained, must pursue ‘the method of the fiercest intransigence’ (Gramsci 1994a, 
67). As noted earlier, this commitment to an unyielding class struggle was rationalized by a stagist 
and dialectical account of history that assumed the masses were now ready for the first stage of 
Socialism. The defensive and compromising politics of the PSI in both its parliamentary and trade 
union forms, he argued, was understandable and even necessary in a pre-revolutionary era in 
which the proletariat was shaped by ‘external influences…dependent upon Capitalist 
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competition’ and the requirement to build up its support base in conditions of legality. However, 
the post-war era was a revolutionary epoch which ‘turned the strategic conditions of the class 
struggle upside down.’ It demanded that the proletariat become an autonomous and resolute 
revolutionary movement developing itself internally as the bearer of a new state, economy and 
civilization. Gramsci thus maintained, ‘the Socialists forgot that their role had to be essentially 
one of criticism, of antithesis. Instead of mastering reality, they allowed themselves to be 
absorbed by it.’ Indeed, this was the explanation for all ‘the deviations, the hesitations, the 
compromises that characterized the whole of the proletarian movement’s existence prior to the 
current period, and which have now culminated in the bankruptcy of the Second International’ 
(Gramsci 1977d, 73-78).  
 
While Gramsci’s intransigence did not extend to Bordiga’s dogmatic electoral and parliamentary 
abstentionism (Cammett 1967, 70), L’Ordine Nuovo gave special prominence to the inflexible 
positions then dominant among the Russian leaders of the Comintern. In an article entitled 
‘Parliamentarism and Sovietism’ Bukharin thus emphasized that ‘the fundamental difference 
between the parliamentary regime and the soviet system [is] …the soviet denies all political rights 
to the non-productive classes’ (1919, 146). This inflexible strategy was also to be adopted to 
Reformists, who were as Lenin expounded in the pages of L’Ordine Nuovo ‘petty-bourgeois 
democrats who abhor the class struggle and dream of how it will be possible to succeed in 
avoiding that struggle …to “make arrangements,” to conciliate, and smooth over the edges’ 
(1920, 20).  
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As the struggle within the Socialist Party intensified throughout 1920 and the anger grew among 
Revolutionaries at the inaction and collaboration of Reformists and Centrists with the demise of 
the councils’ mass revolutionary potential, Gramsci followed this Leninist line unfailingly 
characterizing the Reformists as ‘social traitors’ (1920b, 119). Treves was singled out for 
particular criticism for a lack of faith in the proletarian masses, and his expiation speech identified 
as an exemplary instance of ‘petty-bourgeois’ and collaborationist ideology that endorsed a 
‘theory that was counter-revolutionary and defeatist of proletarian aspirations’ (Gramsci 1977h, 
194). Gramsci indeed eschewed any thought of compromise with Reformists who he deemed ‘an 
infiltration on the part of the ideological agents of capital’ (1977b, 173).  Reformist calls for 
‘Socialist unity’ were thus greeted with the argument that L’Ordine Nuove was not interested in 
agreements between political cliques, but in building unity with the masses through the councils. 
This meant above all an end to the elitist organization and culture of Italian Reformism in both 
its political and economic manifestations and an empowering of the proletarian masses (Gramsci 
1977b, 176-178). 
 
Indeed, the only compromises that appeared palatable to Gramsci in his Biennio Rosso phase 
were those made with the ‘poor peasants’ or ‘rural proletariat’ who along with the urban workers 
were ‘the two driving forces of the proletarian revolution’ (1977j, 86). Compromise here was 
however within the proletariat and based on peasant subordination to the urban working-class 
who were ‘the ordering element’ in this relationship. The alliance with the poor peasantry was 
defended moreover in terms of the need to enlist their mass support to overthrow the bourgeois 
state and empower them to seize ‘collective control over production in the countryside as well’ 
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(Gramsci 1977f, 139-140). Gramsci was thus particularly scathing of Reformist efforts to enlist 
and subordinate the landless peasantry by petty parliamentary reforms such as the promise to 
redistribute ‘uncultivated or poorly cultivated lands’ (1977k, 147). For strategic reasons, 
however, and in line with the Bolshevik model, they would ‘leave intermediate forms of private 
land ownership (small holdings) in existence’ (Gramsci 1977f, 140). This grudging concession to 
the rural petty-bourgeoisie that conspicuously eschewed any idea of an alliance was however as 
far as the Gramsci of the L’Ordine Nuovo was prepared to go. Indeed, he claimed, ‘the petty and 
middle bourgeoisie’ were ‘the worst, vilest, most useless and most parasitical section’ and the 
proletariat had to prepare itself to confront this ‘plague of putrid and voracious locusts’ head-on 
and if necessary ‘To drive them out of society…with steel and fire’ (Gramsci 1977f, 135). 
 
Conclusion: The Biennio Rosso and Socialist democratic strategy in retrospect 
With hindsight, it is of course undeniable that contemporary Italy and Modern Europe ultimately 
rejected the Revolutionary Socialism endorsed by Gramsci in the Biennio Rosso. Insofar as 
Socialism exists at all today, it is the Reformist democratic strategy of Treves that has proved 
more enduring. Thus, a rejection of popular violence, commitment to the rule of law, 
parliamentary democracy (with its rights and freedoms) and Western electoral politics conducted 
predominantly by pragmatic elites pursuing gradual reform is manifestly the modus operandi of 
Socialist and Social Democratic parties today.  Indeed, it is arguable that Gramsci himself in his 
more mature writings in the Prison Notebooks conceded some ground to the strategy 
championed by Treves and Reformists in the Biennio Rosso. For though he did not endorse the 
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substantive Social Democratic vision of a parliamentary road to Socialism (Femia 1981, 190-216) 
and he continued to lambast Reformism (Gramsci 1971, 223-226), some of the positions he 
defended in the Notebooks clearly resonate with Treves’s ideas and Reformism more generally.   
Gramsci thus maintained in his prison writings that different approaches were required for East 
and West as Reformists like Treves had long argued, advocating a distinctive Socialist strategy in 
Western states that privileged a gradual long-term ideological campaign for mass consent in civil 
society (a ‘war of position’). Indeed, in a further tilt towards Treves, he contrasted this strategy 
of ‘hegemony’ with that of the Bolsheviks in the East which was now depicted as heavily 
dependent on violence, coercion and a rapid ‘frontal attack’ (or ‘war of maneuver’) on the state 
(Gramsci 1971, 229-239). Moreover, in prison he endorsed an ‘integral’ Socialist strategy which 
was conceived not solely in terms of soviets, but as the development of an expansive hegemonic 
apparatus of mass institutional support and participation across the spheres of the economy, 
politics and especially civil society with the aim of creating an ‘integral state’ (Gramsci 1971, 9, 
15-16, 239, 267). The echoes of Treves’s ‘integral Socialism’ are unmistakable here – albeit 
configured again in a distinctive Gramscian manner. Finally, Gramsci argued in the Prison 
Notebooks for the necessity of strategic compromises with other social forces (1971, 161) and 
especially the previously excoriated petit bourgeoisie and their intellectual strata. For he now 
recognized that intellectuals were vital intermediary linchpins in influencing and mobilizing the 
masses (Gramsci 1971, 12-13).  Indeed, Gramsci even castigated ‘intransigents’ such as Bordiga 
in his prison writings for a fear of compromise (1971, 167-168); a criticism that might equally 
have been applied to his own  Biennio Rosso writings.   
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It is of course important not to overstate these concessions to Social Democracy or to present 
them as wholesale appropriations of Kautsky’s or Bernstein’s positions (Thomas, 2009: 78-80, 
161-167). It is a mistake too to explain them solely in terms of a conversion to a brand of ‘Western 
Marxism’ since many of these moves were prefigured to some extent by the Comintern’s brief 
but vitally important United Front period that followed the Biennio Rosso in the early to mid-
1920s (McNally 2011, 2015). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc it is in 
any case difficult to imagine even the revised Revolutionary Socialism of the Prison Notebooks 
meeting much success in the West today given the virtual disappearance of Communist parties 
there.  This does not however mean that Gramsci’s vision of Socialism and democracy developed 
in the Biennio Rosso have nothing to offer. Indeed, it is arguable that some of his ideas were 
ahead of their time, and aspects of his approach to democracy and the masses are actually 
becoming increasingly important in contemporary debates on Socialist strategy. 
For it is now widely acknowledged that European Social Democracy – with the decline of party 
and trade union membership and the increasingly professionalized bureaucratic organizational 
structures of its parties - is confronted with a long-term crisis of legitimacy that is above all 
marked by its present failure to develop a strategy capable of mobilizing sustained mass support 
in Western states (see, for example, Cramme and Diamond 2012; Keating and McCrone 2013). 
Ironically, the absence of a notable Communist opposition on the Left in the Post-Cold War era 
has further undermined the popular appeal of its now taken-for-granted principles of non-
violence, the rule of law, parliamentary democracy, strategic compromise and piecemeal reform. 
Indeed, it has brought into sharper relief the elitist nature of its project (Cuperus 2003) and these  
weaknesses are of course being fully exploited by contemporary Left and Centre-Left populist 
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movements in the wake of the 2008 recession and the Eurozone crisis (particularly Movimento 5 
Stelle in Italy, Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece). Thus, they effectively portray established 
Socialist and Social Democratic parties as part of a corrupt cosmopolitan political ‘elite,’ opposing 
the will of ‘the people’ (Mudde, 2016). Stock condemnations of populism that erroneously 
characterize it as necessarily a right-wing, illiberal and irrational phenomenon are unlikely to 
rescue Socialism from this current crisis (March 2007). In fact, it is arguable that this can only 
begin through retrieving the core popular spirit of democracy as an historical process of 
constituting and empowering ‘the people’ to challenge political and economic elites who of 
course have considerable interest in deriding the ‘populist’ logic of democracy as a ‘dangerous’ 
and ‘regressive’ phenomenon (Laclau 2005: 19).  It was this popular orientation to democracy 
that pervaded the thought of Antonio Gramsci in the Biennio Rosso and was extended and 
elaborated in his Prison Notebooks under the concepts of ‘hegemony,’ ‘civil society,’ and most 
importantly, ‘the national-popular’ (see, McNally 2009).  Pursuing it will however require 
Socialism to develop a new and reinvigorated popular organization structure that engages and 
captures contemporary civil society and the masses in a manner which Left populist movements 
have failed so far to achieve. This is the formidable Gramscian challenge that Socialist and Social 
Democratic parties are confronted with today if they are truly to become credible and effective 
democratic movements capable of producing radical political and economic reform. Viewed from 
this perspective, one might argue then in conclusion that the legacies and lessons of Italy’s 
Biennio Rosso span the Reformist and Revolutionary divide and still speak to debates on 
contemporary Socialist and democratic politics in Italy and further afield nearly a century later. 
 
31 
 
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to staff at the Fondazione Istituto Gramsci in Rome for their assistance in carrying 
out the research for this article. I would also like to acknowledge the helpful comments of 
anonymous reviewers to this journal and the participants of a ‘Democracy and Capitalism’ 
workshop at the Manchester Workshops in Political Theory (2013) where a first version of this 
paper was delivered. 
Funding 
The research for this article was partially funded by The Carnegie Trust for the Universities of 
Scotland.  
 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Modern Italian 
Studies on 21 June 2017, available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1354571X.2017.1321932 
1 While Turati was official editor of Critica Sociale from its foundation to its initial dissolution (1891-1926), it is clear 
that Treves played the predominant role at the journal in the Biennio Rosso period, writing the large majority of the 
leading editorial articles in its opening section ‘Politica ed Attualità.’ In fact, Treves’s wider contribution to Socialism 
and Reformism in Italy – as editor of Il Grido del Popolo (1896-98), Il Tempo (1902-10) Avanti (1910-12) and the new 
PSU’s La Giustizia (1922-25) – has been somewhat overshadowed by the focus on Turati in the literature. 
2 It was during the initial suppression of Italian Socialism under Francesco Crispi and his allies in the 1890s that Treves 
served a short prison term (two months) and was forced into exile to avoid further imprisonment (1894-98). On his 
return to Italy he was first elected to the Italian Parliament as a PSI Deputy (1906-1924) and then a PSU Deputy 
(1924-26) after the split. He was again forced to flee Italy in the wave of Fascist reaction that led to Gramsci’s 
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incarceration in November 1926. In exile in France he was a leading figure in the Concentrazione Anti-fascista Italiana 
up until his death in Paris in 1933 (see Casali 1985, 7-129). 
3 The available English-language editions of Gramsci’s L’Ordine Nuovo writings are employed here throughout. Full 
references to the original Italian version of the articles in L’Ordine Nuovo are however also included in the References 
list as they were consulted for contextual purposes. Where no English-language version of these writings or those in 
Critica Sociale were available references are to the original with my own translations. 
4 The prominent Reformists, Leonida Bissolati and Ivanoe Bonomi, were however expelled from the PSI for providing 
qualified support for the Libyan War. This weakening of the Reformist wing facilitated the Maximalist takeover of 
the Party (De Grand 1989, 24-25; Levy 1993, 22). 
5 According to Di Scala the pseudonym “La Critica Sociale” is Turati’s (1980, 13).  
6 The speech was reprinted in Critica Sociale in September 1920. 
7 The translation here is Joseph Butigieg’s (cited in Gramsci 1996, 443). 
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